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RECENT FOURTH AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.'
I. DOMINANCE OF REASONABLENESS CLAUSE OR WARRANTS CLAUSE
By judicial interpretation the fourth amendment has been
divided into two clauses. The first, the reasonableness clause, is the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The second, the warrants clause, delineates the specific require-
ments or contents of warrants.
The historical development of the fourth amendment has cen-
tered around a search for the relationship between these two clauses;
a delineation as to which clause is to be used to determine the con-
stitutional validity of a search and seizure. The warrants clause
may be emphasized by a requirement that warrants be obtained
wherever reasonably practical. On the other hand, the reasonable-
ness clause may be made dominant merely by a requirement that
the search be reasonable. The first of three interpretations emphasiz-
ing the warrants clause came in Trupiano v. United States.2 The
United States Supreme Court stated that:
It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law en-
forcement agents must secure and use search warrants wherever
reasonably practicable.3
This decision, however, was not long lived. Two years later in
United States v. Rabinowitz4 the Court expressly overruled Tru-
piano by making the reasonableness clause dominant in the de-
termination of the validity of a search and seizure.
' The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a
search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable."'5
The requirements of the warrants clause, then, were most obvious-
ly relevant in those cases in which a warrant had been obtained.
Except for recent decisions, the history of the relation between
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
334 US. 699 (1948).
Id. at 705.
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
Id. at 66.
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these two clauses has been thoroughly discussed in numerous arti-
cles. 6 This note will discuss these clauses and their interpretations
only in relation to a few of the very recent United States Supreme
Court cases.7
The Rabinowitz decision, with its emphasis on the reasonable-
ness of a search and seizure, can probably best be described as a
compromise with law enforcement agencies. Trupiano, from the
standpoint of law enforcement, propounded a rigid test: officers
were to obtain a warrant wherever reasonably practical, except
when the search was incident to an arrest. Historically, a warrant
has not been required for this type of search and, as a result, after
Trupiano the incidental search rule became an excuse for not ob-
taining a warrant. Law enforcement agencies, due to this pressure,
were able to bring about the change which came in Rabinowitz.
That-decision was an attempt to change fourth amendment doctrine
so that it would better conform to the demands sought by law
enforcers."
II. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REASONABLENESS
But in introducing this change the Court brought about what
might be an even greater problem-what is reasonableness? Are
there certain criteria which can be used to judge whether a search
is reasonable? "What is the test of reason which makes a search
reasonable?" 9 The reasonableness clause itself provides no answer,
and the Court prefers to determine each case on its merits-on its
own peculiar facts as to whether or not the search is reasonable. 10
This can be seen by the fact that recent cases show the Court has
failed to explicitly state a concrete test for reasonableness. In War-
e See, e.g., Student Symposium-The Fourth Amendment, 25 OHIO ST. LJ. 501
(1946); Symposium-Search and Seizure, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 611 (1965); Search and
Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows 'on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Cil. L. Rn.
664 (1961). -
Emphasis will be placed on: Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967); Cooper v.,California, 386 U.S. 58, (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
- See Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amelulment,
supra note 6, at 678-686.
' United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing opinion).
"' What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula. The
Constitution does not define what are "unreasonable" searches and, regretably, in our
discipline we have no ready litmus paper test. The recurring questions of the reasonable-
ness of the searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case. See
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
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den, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden the search was held to be
valid because the police were in "hot pursuit" of the suspect and
acted reasonably in entering the house to make the search." The
search was unreasonable in Preston v. United States because it was
"too remote in time or place" from the arrest.1 2 In Schrmerber v.
California a blood sample taken to test for intoxication was reason-
able because there was a "clear indication" that the officer would
find evidence of intoxication.' 3
The Court has recognized the difficulty involved in defining
specific criteria of a reasonable search.
Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract
prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" into
workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a dif-
ficult task which has for many years divided members of this
Court .... 14
Unfortunately there can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails.' 5
What is needed, however, is a test, not for the Supreme Court
alone, but one which will establish workable guidelines for lower
courts and law enforcement officials. It is not enough to judge each
case separately and on its own particular facts. What are lower
court judges, lawyers, and especially law enforcement officers to do
with a particular fact pattern with which the Court has not dealt
or with facts slightly different from those with which the Court has
already dealt?
It is no guide at all either for a jury or for district judges or the
police to say that 'an unreasonable search' is forbidden-that the
search must be reasonable.' 8
The most important question is whether any criteria have been
" 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967).
" 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964).
' 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
" Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
' Id. at 536.
" United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfuzter, J., dissent-
ing opinion). Some factors which have been considered to be relevant to the reasonable-
ness of a search are covered in 25 OHIo ST. L. J. 501, 553 (1964). Among them are
the scope of the area covered; the nature and number of items to be seized; the time
the search occurs; the place to be searched; whether arrest is merely a pretext for search.
Cases dealing with each one of these factors are legion. Can we call these effective guide-
lines for police conduct?
1968]
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specified in recent cases which could form a guideline or test. What
standards, if any, has the Court set for itself? Recent decisions indi-
cate that the Court may be establishing the specifications of the war-
rants clause as just such a test.17 This can be seen as a return to the
interpretation of the fourth amendment typified by Trupiano. The
philosophy of Trupiano goes much deeper than merely a decision
which requires that a warrant be obtained wherever reasonably
practical. It is a way of looking at the basic relationship between the
two clauses of the fourth amendment. The basic premise of Trupi-
ano was that the warrants clause is the most important part of the
fourth amendment, that it should be stressed and should dominate
over the reasonableness clause in determining the validity of searches
and seizures.' 8 It is to this premise to which the majority today
seems to be returning.
The cases which deal specifically with warrants show the pre-
ferred position in which the warrants clause is placed in the eyes
of the Court. In Aguilar v. Texas'9 Justice Goldberg reaffirmed the
view taken in United States v. Lefkowitz20 that
[t]he informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates
empowered to issue warrants. . .are to be preferred over the
hurried action of officers .. .who may happen to make ar-
rests.2 L
Again writing for the majority in United States v. Ventresca he
seemed to show an even stronger inclination toward the warrants
clause:
In Jones v. United States . . ., this Court, strongly sup-
porting the preference to be accorded searches under a warrant,
indicated that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a
warrant may be sustained where one without would fall.22
Thissame preference is shown in Camara v. Municipal Court,
the Court overruling Frank v. Maryland28 which had previously held
IT See, L. Herman Searches Without Warrants, in REI ERENCE MANUAL FOR CON.
TINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAM § 3.01 (Ohio Legal Center Institute, 1966);
See also, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendmn,
supra note 6, at 686.
See L Herman, Searches Without Warrants, supra note 17, at § 3.01.
' 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
285 U.S. 452 (1932).
378 U.S. at 110.
380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965); See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)
and Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
2' 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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warrants unnecessary in municipal health, fire, and safety inspec-
tions.
[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search
of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable'
unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.24
In See v. City of Seattle,25 the companion case to Camara, the Court
stated that Camara held:
[A] search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable
if conducted without a warrant.26
and that,
We hold only that the basic component of a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment-that it not be enforced
without a suitable warrant procedure-is applicable in this con-
text, as in others .... 2
Berger v. New York28 gave the Court the opportunity, under
the doctrine of reasonableness, to sanction the use of eavesdropping
devices, especially under the New York law which contained safe-
guards modeled somewhat after warrants clause requirements. In
striking down that statute, however, the majority refused to retreat
from strict adherence to warrants clause requirements.
It is said that neither a warrant nor a statute can be drawn
so as to meet the Fourth Amendment's requirements. If that be
true then the "fruits" of eavesdropping devices are barred
under the Amendment.29
2' 387 US. at 528. It is interesting to note that MacDonald v. United States, 335
US. 451 (1948), is cited as authority for this statement. MdcDonad was decided only
six months after Trupiano and at a time when the Court still adhered to the Trpiano
doctrine.
Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magis-
trate between the citizen and the police.
Id. at 455.
2 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
" Id. at 543.
' Id. at 546.
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
' Id. at 63. In its most recent pronouncement the Supreme Court definitely reaf-
firmed its rigorous holding in Berger:
'Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth]
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,' .. . and that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment ....
Katz v. United States, 36 U.S.LW. 4080, 4082 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1967).
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These cases dealt with the requirements of warrants and the
content of warrants when they are obtained, or, as in See and
Camara, the new requirement of procuring a warrant for municipal
health, safety, and fire inspection. As such they do not put the rea-
sonableness theory of Rabinowitz to its greatest test, nor show the
extent to which the reasonableness test has been replaced through
use of the warrant criteria. They do show, however, the influence
of the warrants clause on the Court as exemplified by the preferred
position in which that clause is placed.
III. SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT INCIDENT TO AN ARREST
Rabinowitz, then, marked the real beginning of the era of the
search without a warrant incident to an arrest. It is this type of
search which is the most difficult to deal with in terms of a test of
reasonableness, for here there are no criteria and no guidelines-
only the blank statement that a search must be reasonable. But it
is here that the requirements of the warrants clause may be used
to mark the boundaries of a reasonable search. The requirements
of the warrants clause are:
(1) Probable cause supported by oath or affirmation that
the particular person or thing can be found in the place to be
searched.
(2) A specific place to be searched, particularly described.
(3) Specific persons or things to be seized, particularly de-
scribed.
(4) All these must be reviewed by the magistrate who de-
cides whether or not to issue the warrant.
Obviously the independent judgment of the magistrate is lost in a
search incident to an arrest. But can the other requirements of the
clause be used? Are they now used by the Court? Examination of
a few of the recent decisions suggests that the answer is "yes"-these
searches seem to conform to those requirements.
Schmerber v. California0 and Warden, Maryland Penitentiary
v. Hayden8 clearly fit into the category of necessity, the historical
requisite for a search incident to an arrest.8 2 In addition, they meet
warrants clause requirements. Using the definition of probable
'0 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
" 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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cause formulated in Carroll v. United States,3 the officers in both
Hayden and Schmerber had probable cause to search. In Hayden
a cab driver had followed the petitioner from the scene of the rob-
bery and had seen him go into a house. He radioed this information
to police headquarters along with a description of the clothes the
petitioner was wearing. It was held, in effect, that the officers had
probable cause to enter the house and make the search.
They acted reasonably when they entered the house and
The term "necessity" is used to describe the three basic historical justifications
for the search incident to an arrest without a warrant:
(1) The need to protect the arresting officer by depriving the suspect of concealed
weapons.
(2) The need to deprive the accused of a means of escape.
(3) The need to prevent the destruction of the evidence of the crime.
See Symposium--Search and Seizure, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 611, 617 (1965).
This test was met in Schmerber,
The officer ... might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with
an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant under the
circumstances, threatened "the destruction of the evidence ....
384 U.S. at 770.
In Hayden,
Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons
and weapons could have insured that Hayden was the only man present and
that the police had control of all weapons which could be used against them
or to effect an escape.
387 U.S. at 299.
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925):
[Where] the facts and circumstances within their [arresting officers] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that [an of-
fense is being or has been committed].
See generally Student Symposium: The Fourth Amendment, Probable Case: The
Federal Standard, 25 Omo ST. L.J. 501 (1964). A new and interesting development
in the definition of probable cause came last term in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967). The Court held that administrative searches, specifically health, fire,
and safety inspections, must be accompanied by a warrant if the occupant objects. Prob-
able cause to obtain the warrant, however, was made much more lenient-it exists if
certain legislative and administrative standards are met, e.g., nature or age of the build-
ing or the condition of the area. While the Court declared this weakening of probable
cause will not leak into the criminal investigative area, 387 U.S. at 538, what will
happen in the area of "stop and frisk?" This is an area which has been considered on
borderline of administrative and criminal searches. See People v. Sibron, 18 App. Div.
2d 603, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1964), prob. juris. noted, 386 US. 954 (1967), which
could answer this question. For petitioner's brief before United States Supreme Court
in the Sibron case see 3 CRIm L. BuLL. 441 (1967).
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began to search for a man of the description they had been
given and for weapons he had used in the robbery or might
use against them.3 4
It follows from this that the officers had probable cause to believe
the suspect was in the house along with the stolen money and the
weapons he had used. In Schmerber it seemed almost certain that
the blood test would yield incriminating evidence. There was a
liquor smell on petitioner's breath and his eyes were "bloodshot,
watery, sort of a glassy appearance." In fact there was a "clear indi-
cation" that the test would yield evidence of intoxication.85 Also,
in this case there was a specific place to be searched and a specific
thing to be seized, both requirements of the warrants clause. The
place was the body of the petitioner; the specific item was the blood
that was to be taken for the test. The specific place to be searched
in Hayden was the house of the petitioner.
[The officers were in hot pursuit of the suspect.] The per-
missible scope of search must, therefore, at least, be as broad
as may reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers that the
suspect at large in the house may resist or escape. 8 0
The specific things the officers were looking for were the man, the
money and the weapon.37
Preston38 is the opposite of Hayden and Schmerber. That case
involved the arrest of four men on vagrancy charges and the subse-
quent search of their impounded car which revealed burglary tools.
There was no necessity whatsoever in terms of that historical test.80
It was not a search incidental to an arrest.
Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search
made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not inci-
dent to the arrest.40
While the officers had a specific place to search, there was no indi-
387 U.S. at 298.
, 384 U.S. at 770.
26 387 U.S. at 299. Compare the scope of this search with that in Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
" 387 U.S. at 299. Petitioner argued that the officer who found the clothing made a
general search of the premises, not really knowing what he was looking for and that li
certainly was not looking for clothing. The Court countered by saying the oflicer testified
he was looking for the man and the money and under the, circumstances, the inference
he was also looking for weapons is fully justified. Id. at 300.
376 .S. 364 (1964).
See text accompanying note 34 supra.
" 376 U.S. at 367.
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cation they were looking for any specific item. It was merely a gen-
eral exploratory search of the petitioner's car. The Court stated
that, while the officers might have had probable cause to search the
car at the time and place of arrest, the actual search here, which
took place after the petitioner was in jail and the car was im-
pounded, was too remote from the arrest to meet the test of reason-
ableness.
These three cases dealing with searches without warrants meet
the requirements of the warrants clause. To this extent they lend
support to the idea that the Court is shifting back to the interpre-
tation of the fourth amendment expressed by Trupiano and is
using the warrants clause as its benchmark in fourth amendment
litigation to determine the ultimate goal of reasonableness.
Cooper v. California4l seems to disrupt this trend. In Cooper
the petitioner was arrested after having sold narcotics to an inform-
er. Petitioner's car, in which the transaction took place, was subse-
quently impounded pursuant to the California Health and Safety
Code. One week after the arrest the search in question was made
which turned up a small brown piece of paper subsequently used
in the conviction of petitioner.
Until Cooper, a search without a warrant had never been up-
held if not incidental to an arrest.42 Such searches were not within
any exception to the constitutional requirement of a warrant. In
Cooper, the State of California conceded the search was not inci-
dental to the arrest, but claimed the search was reasonable be-
cause of the requirements of the California Health and Safety Code.
Under that statute, upon arrest for violation of narcotics law, the
officers are to seize any vehicle connected with that violation and
hold it as evidence until either released or forfeited to the state.42
The state argued that because they had lawful custody under the
statute they were entitled to search the car.
The California District Court of Appeals relied on Preston v.
a 386 US. 58 (1967).
"Many lower courts, however, have upheld these searches. See L Herman, Searches
Without Warrants, in REFERENCE MANUAL FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
PROGRAM § 3.14 (Ohio Legal Center Institute, 1966).
a CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11610-11 (West 1964). There are two sec-
tions of that code which apply here. Section 11610 provides that any vehicle used to
transport narcotics shall be forfeited to the state. Section 11611 authorizes the arresting
officers to seize such a vehicle and impound it until forfeited or released.
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United States to invalidate the search.44 As previously noted, that
search was invalidated on the grounds that it was "too remote" from
the time and place of arrest.45 A look at the language of the opinion
seems to indicate that the real basis of the Preston decision was that
the search was not incidental to an arrest.
We think that the search was too remote in time or place
to have been made as incidental to the arrest, and conclude,
therefore, that the search of the car without a warrant failed
to meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amend.
ment.. .. (Emphasis added.) 46
But, the search in Cooper was even more remote than that in
Preston. Both were searches of cars. Both searches were made with-
out a warrant. Neither was made incidental to an arrest. Why, then,
the difference in Cooper? The Court had to distinguish the two.
While the
'[l]awful custody of the automobile does not itself dispense
with the constitutional requirements of searches thereafter
made of it' . . . the reason for and nature of the custody may
constitutionally justify the search.47
In other words, the custody of the car in Preston had nothing to do
with the charge for which he was arrested-vagrancy. The officers
impounded the car simply because they did not wish to leave it
in the street.48 But in Cooper the officers were required by law to
keep the car until it was either forfeited or released. Petitioner
was arrested for violation of narcotics law-his car was impounded
for this reason.
Their subsequent search of the car ... was closely related
to the reason petitioner was arrested, the reason his car had been
impounded and the reason it was being retained .... It would
be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the car
in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even
for their own protection, - to search it.49
But, in light of Preston, why the search is reasonable is not
altogether clear. The State could not justify the search on the
" 234 Cal. App. 2d 587, 44 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1967). Note that while the search
was declared invalid the conviction was affirmed on basis of the California harmless
error rule.
" 376 U.S. at 368.
" Id.





basis that it had title to the car because the forfeiture proceeding
did not take place until over four months after the car was im-
pounded, which was after the petitioner was convicted. If the
authority for the search was the fact the police had custody of the
car, there was also custody in Preston; there would seem to be no
reason why the police would have any more control in Cooper.50
The Court may be saying this was custody of a special kind-it was
authorized by statute. This would have to be the distinctive basis
for the decision unless it is conceded that Preston is overruled.51
The decision in Cooper cannot be justified in terms of the
warrants clause as could Preston. The officers might have had prob-
able cause to believe something was in the car, but this does not
seem likely. If they had probable cause they would have searched
the car immediately after seizure. While the car was a specific place
to search, the officers did not have a specific item in mind which
they were going to seize. This is a case in which the officers, who
already had enough evidence to convict the petitioner, rummaged
through the car without probable cause to believe that anything
could be found. It seems to have all the earmarks of a general
search of the type prohibited by the fourth amendment. Although
courts have rarely attempted to define the term "general search,"
the definition can be taken from the warrants clause itself-a search
in which the officers do not know what they are looking for, or
one in which they have no probable cause or reasonable expecta-
tion of finding an item in the place they are looking. Cooper seems
to clearly fit within this definition.
Where the Cooper decision will lead is not easy to predict. It
raises questions as to whether or not areas normally extended
fourth amendment protection will lose that protection when taken
into custody (extended beyond the forfeiture statute). It raises
questions as to other searches, apart from automobiles, without a
warrant and not incident to an arrest-a search which by definition
and by the ruling in Preston does not fit within the exception for
386 U.S. at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).
This seems to be the way to best characterize the decision-that the forfeiture
statute gave the state a proprietary interest or even a property interest in the car and,
therefore, had the right of search. See State v. Dill, 151 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1967).
But this too raises a question-if the state had a property interest of some sort in the
car, how can petitioner object to the search? Should not the case have gone off on stand-
ing? On the point of overruling Preston see Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 at 65
(1967), (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion) and Stewart v. People, 426 P.2d 545 (Colo.
1967).
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searches incidental to an arrest and should, therefore, be void as
a general search.52 Cooper has already been used by lower courts to
justify searches without a warrant not incident to an arrest even
though no state forfeiture statute is involved.58 It is read as loosening
the bonds to the constitutional exception for incidental searches.64
In all probability Cooper is an exceptional decision, depend.
ing upon the existence of the forfeiture statute.55 It may even be
limited to searches of automobiles. If Cooper is based purely upon
the reasonableness of the search, it is a prime example of the failure
of that standard to provide workable guidelines for lower courts,
such- as the California District Court of Appeals and for law en-
forcement agencies.
IV. PROPOSAL
The warrants clause can provide guidelines for determining
whether a search incident to an arrest is reasonable. This test is in
line with that which the framers of the amendment set up for
searches and seizures with warrants. This was to be the best way to
set a balance between the interests of law enforcement and the
invasions to personal liberty and privacy which result from searches
and seizures. To hold searches without warrants up to these stand-
ards would be to hold all searches up to constitutional require-
ments-requirements set up by the framers themselves. It would
bring all searches within the scope of the warrants clause and at the
same time give a definite test to those searches made without a
warrant. A warrants clause test would give some content to the
standard of reasonableness which up to now has been ,devoid of
any fixed or predictable guidelines.
Using the warrants clause as criteria would ask that police,
, See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 at 63 (1967), (Douglas, J., dissenting
opinion) (paraphrasing opinion of California District Court of Appeals): "Since the
search was not pursuant to a warrant and since it was not incident to petitioner's arrest,
it was illegal."
' See United States v. McKendrick, 266 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Stewart
v. People, 426 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1967); Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.11. 2d
443 (1967); State v. Omo, 428 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1967).
" See Davidson v. Boles, 266 F. Supp. 645 (N.D.W.Va. 1967); Draper v. Mary-
land, 265 F.Supp. 718 (D. Md. 1967).
" It should be noted here that the main issue was the California harmless error
rule rather than the search issue under the fourth amendment. This being so, this
opinion may be the result of inadequate consideration of what was here a side Issue.
Also note the petitioner did not argue in terms of a general search but simply on
whether there could ever be a valid, warrantless search not incident to an arrest.
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first, have a specified place in mind when they begin the search.
Second, a specific object or item must be the aim of the search.
Third, they must have probable cause to believe that the item
they are searching for will be found in the specific place where they
are searching. Law enforcers may not properly look in a place where
the object could not reasonably be expected to be found.
It is up to the United States Supreme Court and lower courts
to apply these requirements to searches without warrants. Without
them, the reasonableness clause will allow police to make general
and exploratory searches. WThen no guidelines are drawn and no
rules laid out, the way is open for law enforcement to take ad-
vantage of this weakness in the law.
The problem stems from the basic question of the relation
between the two clauses of the fourth amendment. Which clause
was meant to be determinative in judging the validity of a search
and seizure? It is suggested that the warrants clause will yield greater
clarity and predictibility as guidelines to lawyers and law enforcers,
and more continuity and stability in decision making on the part
of the courts.
Allen Clark
1968]
